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Introduction 
Hubristic leaders are powerful and successful individuals who become excessively confident 
and ambitious in their strategic decision choices.  In doing so they show contempt for the 
advice and criticism of others.  As a result, they often end-up over-reaching themselves and 
inflicting damage, both financial and reputational, on themselves and their organizations.  
Perhaps the highest profile recent example of hubristic leadership in management is Richard 
J. Fuld who helped build Lehman Brothers into one of the most formidable Wall Street 
trading businesses.  His hubris contributed not only to his own and the company’s demise but 
also to the 2007/2008 financial crisis, the effects of which are still being felt a decade on.  
Business is replete with examples of organizational failures which were linked to hubristic 
leadership.  These include Long-Term Capital Management (which went into liquidation 
following its crash in 1998) and BP’s Deepwater Horizon blow-out in the Gulf of Mexico 
(the costs of which are estimated at the time of writing to be $65billion).  Hubristic 
leadership’s damaging effects are not limited to business leadership.  In politics, George W 
Bush exhibited hubris in his decision to invade Iraq in 2003.  President Trump shows many 
of the hallmarks of hubris. 
Given the scale of its destructive effects, it is surprising that compared to topics such 
as narcissism and charisma, hubris has received comparatively little attention in management 
and leadership research.  In this article we bring hubristic leadership to the attention of 
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management scholars, practitioners and students by explaining its characteristics and causes 
and suggesting how its potentially destructive consequences might be combatted. 
Characteristics of Hubris 
Hubristic executives systematically and repeatedly make strategic decision choices that are 
over-confident and over-ambitious. They show contempt and arrogance towards the advice 
and criticism of others. As a result, they run the risk of over-reaching themselves and inviting 
unintended negative consequences. 
The significance of hubris (Greek: hybris) has been recognized since Classical times.  
Greek mythology contains various tales of human hubristic excess and consequent divine 
retribution and punishment in the form of Nemesis.  Perhaps the most famous example is the 
myth of Icarus and Dædalus.  The father (Dædalus) and his son (Icarus) acquired, through 
Dædalus’ craftsmanship with feathers and wax, the God-like power of flight which they used 
to escape from Crete where they had been imprisoned by King Minos. In their attempt to 
escape: 
“…all this adventurous flying went to Icarus’ head…he’d fallen in love with the 
sky, and soared higher and higher.  The scorching rays of the sun grew closer and 
softened the fragrant wax which fastened his plumage.  The wax dissolved; 
and…Icarus flapped his naked arms deprived of the wings which had caught the 
air that was buoying them upwards” (Metamorphóses, Book 8, lines 221-230). 
Icarus was so intoxicated by his power of flight that he became impervious to his father’s 
warning.  Because of his hubristic excess, he plunged to his death.  The moral of the story is 
often taken as ‘don’t fly too close to the sun’, but Dædalus actually implored Icarus to fly 
neither too high nor too low.  This reflects a general principle of classical Greek civilization: 
‘nothing in excess’, as inscribed on the Temple of Apollo at Delphi.  The metaphor alerts us 
not only to the dangers of hubristic excess, but also to the challenge for leaders of 
maintaining a balance between deficiency and excess.  Like Icarus, hubristic executives’ 
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behaviors, because of their inflated self-belief in their ability to bring about positive 
outcomes, can tip over into excess. 
The main features of hubris have been captured comprehensively in the concept of 
‘hubris syndrome’.  Hubris syndrome is defined in terms of a set of fourteen attributes which 
often occur together, are associated with holding significant positional power under 
conditions of largely unfettered discretion and following a period of considerable prior 
successes (Table 1).  The consequences of these behaviors manifest as hubristic 
incompetence.  The idea of a hubris syndrome first appeared in The Hubris Syndrome (2007) 
by David Owen (a politician by profession, Owen was UK Foreign Secretary in the late 
1970s, he is a member of the House of Lords and a neurologist by training).  Owen described 
the hubris syndrome as a disorder of position as much as of the person.  In Owen’s 
‘symptomology’ for hubris syndrome over-confidence and over-ambition (Attribute 8 in 
Table 1) are accompanied typically by contempt for the advice and criticism of others 
(Attribute 7). 
Whilst some of the diagnostic behaviors for hubris syndrome overlap with narcissism, 
hubris is distinct from narcissism in several ways.  Narcissism is a personality trait 
characterized by self-absorption, grandiosity and a sense of entitlement.  Narcissists believe 
that they are uniquely special and deserving of praise and admiration. They can become 
arrogant and hostile if their grandiose yet shallow and fragile self-concept, which they need 
to constantly maintain, is threatened.  Hubris on the other hand is not a personality trait; it is a 
transitory state which develops in the wake of prior successes and the acquisition of 
significant power, and which may abate once power is lost.  Narcissists are intoxicated with 
themselves, whilst hubrists are intoxicated with power and success. 
[Table 1 here] 
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Hubris figured prominently in the rise and fall of Hank Greenberg, former CEO of 
AIG. His fall illustrates the perils of ‘flying too close to the sun’ as recounted in Mathew 
Hayward’s Ego Check (2007).  Greenberg pushed constantly against the boundaries of 
acceptability in corporate behavior until he finally over-reached himself.  He resigned in 2005 
in response to an accounting scandal in which AIG not only overstated the value of its assets 
and earnings, but also concealed losses.  Hayward suggests that this was the culmination of a 
trail of over-ambition, false confidence and excess on Greenberg’s part.  He overestimated 
what he could achieve personally, and what he and the company could get away with.  A 
hubristic excess of confidence and pride gave license to overconfident strategic choices and 
reckless over-ambition.  Once these allegations came to light, New York district Attorney 
Elliott Spitzer filed charges of corporate misconduct against AIG.  The company ended-up 
paying over a billion dollars in penalties and settlements.  Greenberg resigned, with his 
reputation damaged severely because, in Hayward’s analysis, his supreme confidence gave 
way to hubris. 
As well as being over-confident, hubristic leaders are also contemptuous (Attribute 7, 
Table 1).  Kenneth Lay was Chairman and CEO of Enron when more than 20,000 employees 
lost their jobs and investors lost billions of dollars.  Lay was contemptuous not only of the 
financial rules in his ‘cooking of the books’, but also of the legal process.  Throughout his 
trial Lay refused to accept responsibility for Enron’s failings.  He claimed that he had been 
left in the dark as to what was going on, and placed the blame at the door of Enron’s CFE, 
Andrew Fastow.  Prosecutors and the court begged to differ, claiming that Enron was a 
financial house of cards with elaborate accounting schemes dreamed-up by Lay and others in 
contempt of professional, legal and ethical codes.  Right to the end, as reported in the press 
Lay remained scornful of the legal outcome: “I firmly believe that I am innocent of the 
charges against me, as I have said from day one.  I still firmly believe that to this day”. 
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The paradox of hubris is that leadership attributes such as confidence can be both a 
strength and a weakness (Attribute 14).  Confidence can be highly beneficial in achieving 
results and motivating others. However, this is true only up to a point. Confidence in its 
extreme forms can manifest as recklessness and contempt.  Hubristic leaders fail to calibrate 
the balance between a deficiency and an excess of a given leadership capability (such as 
confidence, ambition, etc.).  These miscalibrations emanate from inflated self-beliefs that tip 
the balance towards hubris.  For example, it is well documented that hubristic CEOs often 
over-pay for acquisitions (see the extensive literature around Richard Roll’s ‘Hubris 
Hypothesis’ research first published in 1986).  Over-confident CEOs typically behave as 
though they know it all and hence feel no need for advice.  An instance of this is former 
Rubbermaid CEO, Wolfgang Schmitt.  He was over-confident to the point of recklessness.  
He was also arrogant and contemptuous towards critical voices.  One Rubbermaid insider 
commented that Wolf believed ‘he knew everything about everything’.  Unfortunately for 
Rubbermaid, Schmitt closed-down points of view other than his own.  His brashly over 
confident decisions help to explain how the company went from being Fortune Magazine’s 
‘Most Admired Company in America’ in 1993 to being acquired in 1999 by Newell Brands 
following a controversial spat over pricing with Wal-Mart. 
Contrast this with more grounded CEOs who seek trusted advisors and naysayers who 
are willing and able to challenge them.  This is exemplified by Michael Dell.  His rule of 
thumb is that every decision must be made by at least two people. This helps to guard against 
over-confidence in his business.  In his autobiography, Dell described how he segmented his 
job role by bringing in another executive, Mort Topfer (1994 to 2002), to serve as a Vice-
Chairman and counselor.  Dell’s decision was based on his self-evaluation of how limiting it 
would be for the business if he tried to pursue all opportunities himself: “We’ve come to 
know that two heads are better than one.  Mort and I have complementary strengths so we 
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each focus on areas where we can contribute the most value.  It’s a divide and conquer 
approach marked by constant communication and shared decision making which multiplies 
our individual capacities for success” (Michael Dell, Direct from Dell: Strategies that 
Revolutionized an Industry, 2004, p. 114). 
Causes of Hubris 
Three categories of causal factors are associated with hubristic leadership: individual factors, 
situational factors, and relational factors. 
Individual Factors: several individual factors predispose a leader to hubris, including inflated 
self-beliefs and gender.  Hubristic leaders have inflated ability expectations allied to inflated 
beliefs that their strategic choices will lead to successful outcomes.  Strategic management 
researchers Nathen Hiller and Donald Hambrick have identified four components of inflated 
self-evaluation that predispose a leader to being over-confident and to make over-optimistic 
strategic choices: 1: self-esteem (‘I am worthy’), 2: self-efficacy (‘I can do this’), 3: internal 
locus of control (‘Life’s events are within my control’) and 4: emotional stability (‘I am not 
anxious’).  Inflation of these four components of core self-evaluation (CSE), to the point of 
hyper-CSE, are likely to be associated with more intuitive decision processes and instinctive 
strategic decision making, together with greater control of decision making by the CEO.  
Hyper-CSE CEOs tend to consider themselves above average on positive characteristics, they 
attribute positive outcomes to their own actions and failure to bad luck.  Further, highly 
competitive people often fix on those things that they succeed at, feeding their desire to 
succeed.  As a result they are more likely to take reckless decisions and deride contrary 
voices. 
Both men and women are prone to over-confident behaviors.  But males appear more 
inclined to hubris than females (which could of course be a glass ceiling effect).  In male-
dominated areas, such as financial markets, over-confident traders trade more and take more 
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risks than females, and in doing so risk losing more money.  A possible biological 
explanation for this effect is the role of testosterone.  High levels of testosterone are 
associated with increased opportunity-seeking and risk-taking.  This can create a self-
reinforcing cycle. Winning results in testosterone release.  This increases confidence levels 
that in turn pave the way for further successes and risk taking (a ‘winner effect’) until, in the 
words of neuroscientist and hubris researcher Peter Garrard of the University of London, the 
bubble of invincibility is suddenly and painfully burst by failure.  Research by former Wall 
Street trader, now neuroscientist, John Coates and colleagues has shown that increased levels 
of testosterone can contribute to irrational exuberance.  When hubristic exuberance infects a 
whole trading floor it can add to instability in financial markets and eventually contribute to a 
bull market becoming a bubble.  This has prompted researchers to suggest that greater 
stability might be achieved in the finance sector, not only through much-needed better 
regulation, but by having more females on trading floors. 
Situational Factors:  A track record of organizational success can inflate executives’ beliefs 
in their ability to control events.  A presumption that success breeds success can also create 
the conditions whereby a leader’s or organization’s strengths paradoxically become 
weaknesses.  This paradox of strengths-into-weaknesses was captured by Danny Miller in The 
Icarus paradox: How exceptional companies bring about their own downfall.  Miller 
identifies four, ‘time-bomb trajectories’: (a) (over-)focusing: quality-driven, craftsmen-type 
organizations become rigidly controlled detail-obsessed tinkerers; (b) (over-)venturing: 
growth-driven, entrepreneurial builders become impulsive, greedy imperialists expanding 
their businesses helter-skelter into areas they know nothing about; (c) (over-)inventing: 
pioneers with unrivalled R&D capabilities and state-of-the-art operations become utopian 
escapists run by scientists and technologists who squander resources on fascinating but 
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grandiose schemes; (d) decoupling: sales-type organizations with unparalleled branding and 
marketing become aimless bureaucratic drifters obsessed by a sales fetishism. 
Miller illustrated the Icarus Paradox using the example of ITT.  President and CEO 
Harold S. Geneen’s previous successes in leading diversification and seemingly controlled 
decentralization became eventually a fanatical, all-consuming, end-in-itself way of life.  This 
led the company into ever more ambitious, grandiose and sometimes hostile acquisitions. 
These were often further and further removed from the business’ telecoms and technological 
core, including acquisitions such as Sheraton Hotels, Avis Car Rental and Continental 
Baking. These were just three out of one hundred of Geneen’s acquisitions. With 375,000 
employees across 80 countries, ITT became the largest conglomerate on earth.  This is an 
example of a corporate venturing trajectory gone wrong.  Geneen’s hubristic leadership led 
ITT to amplify a sensible, measured expansion strategy into a senseless drive for 
diversification as an end in itself.  As a result, product lines became neglected, different 
business units experienced major operating problems and returns fell sharply.  ITT’s very 
successes paved the way for excesses that led to the decline of a once outstanding company.  
In terms of Miller’s trajectories, a highly successful ‘Builder’ morphed into a grossly 
gratuitous ‘Imperialist’. 
Hubris is compounded by a context in which an organization’s successes are credited 
personally to the CEO rather than to a combination of efforts of the team or other, extraneous 
factors.  Being lauded by the media as a business celebrity can foster a CEO’s self-delusion 
of control and influence.  The conditions for hubris to arise are amplified by failings of 
corporate governance and regulation, especially if the CEO also chairs the board. The 
situation is made worse when there is a high proportion of insiders on the board together with 
small levels of company stock being held by external members leading to the checks and 
balances that are in place being unfit for purpose. 
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The tone from the top of an organization is instrumental in creating a hubristic 
culture.  This was shown to be a cause of leadership failures in NASA (Columbia disaster) 
and BP (Deepwater Horizon blowout).  Needless to say finance has not been immune.  A 
senior Bank of England official, Andrew Bailey, in his last speech as Chief Executive of the 
Prudential Regulation Authority in 2016 observed that “there has not been a case of a major 
prudential or conduct failing in a firm which did not have among its root causes a failure of 
culture as manifested in governance, remuneration, risk management or tone from the top.” 
Relational Factors: Relational processes are concerned with the things that leaders bring to 
their interpersonal exchanges with peers and subordinates.  The significance of differential 
relationships between a hubristic leader and members of the senior management team is 
illustrated by exchanges that took place within Lehman Brothers.  In the lead-up to Lehman 
Brothers’ eventual bankruptcy in 2008, the deteriorating economic situation of 2006-2007 led 
members of Lehman’s top management team to arrive at conflicting interpretations of what 
they should do.  Some executives sensed trouble ahead and urged caution.  Others thought the 
signs indicated only a short-term problem, whilst still others interpreted the emerging 
problems as an opportunity for the firm.  The hubris of the CEO, supported by his like-
minded COO, meant that the two most senior executives were prepared only to hear positive 
messages that resonated with their like-minded interpretations of the situation Lehman 
Brothers faced.  In their view, the firm had overcome similar problems in the past and would 
no doubt do so again. As the tidal wave of external dangers gathered, several senior managers 
urged a change of course but by then it was too late.  Hubristic leadership had set off a train 
of events that took on a life of its own. 
A valuable social exchange mechanism for a hubristic leader is possession of a ‘toe-
holder’. This is an individual who can, through mutual trust built-up through repeated 
interpersonal experiences, common values, beliefs, goals and attitudes, restrain a hubristic 
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leaders’ over-exuberance.  This is also illustrated in the concept of the ‘organizational fool’ 
put forward by Manfred Kets de Vries’ in Leaders, Fools and Imposters (1993).  The fool is 
not stupid, quite the reverse.  The fool is the guardian of reality who constantly reminds the 
leader of the transience of power in the hope of preventing hubristic actions on the part of his 
leader.  The toe-holder provides an antidote to the CEO’s inflated self-evaluations as well as 
to those of the sycophants whose constant admiration may bolster a hubristic leader’s inflated 
self-evaluation.  Recall that Michael Dell regarded it as important that he brought someone 
into the executive team with a different mindset from his own.  Likewise the behavioral 
exchange between President Franklin D Roosevelt and his toe-holder Louis Howe helped to 
keep FDR in check. 
Consequences of Hubris 
Hubris has been found to have negative consequences in various aspects of business, 
particularly in relation to mergers and acquisitions, diversification, and entrepreneurship. 
Mergers and acquisitions: CEO over-confidence was first researched in the 1980s by the 
behavioral finance scholar Richard Roll.  He proposed what he termed the Hubris Hypothesis 
arguing that, in corporate takeovers, hubristic bidding managers typically convince 
themselves that their estimated valuation of the target firm is correct and when challenged 
claim that it is the market, not they themselves, that fails to reflect the true economic value of 
the combined firms.  However, the gains realized from the merged firm are frequently non-
positive.  The anticipated synergies fail to be realized.  Hubristic over-confidence on the part 
of senior executives was an important factor in Datapoint’s poor decision to acquire Inforex 
in 1980 only a year after Inforex had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  Not surprisingly, 
Datapoint suffered a huge, 95 per cent, reduction in net income shortly after purchasing 
Inforex.  Similarly, Chrysler’s acquisition of AMC is baffling given that AMC’s problems of 
poor image, low market share, outmoded and unprofitable manufacturing plants and negative 
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working capital were well known at the time.  Falling prey to executives’ hubristic over-
confidence in the acquisition, Chrysler experienced significant production, labor and 
management problems, and its overall productivity plummeted.  In M&As it’s important that 
a firm examines its core competencies to see if they align with the new situation.  In this 
situation reflexivity through introspection, if done properly, can be an antidote to hubristic 
M&A decisions. 
Diversification: As with M&As, hubristic executives misjudge the benefits and costs 
associated with diversification decisions.  As a result, they are likely to diversify beyond what 
is optimum.  Buoyed up by over-confidence, executives often diversify beyond what is 
sensible.  Costas Markides, writing in Harvard Business Review as far back as 1997, 
suggested that before firms decide to diversify, executives should ask themselves searching 
questions such as:  what does our business do best; what assets are needed to succeed in a 
new market; can we realistically catch-up or leapfrog competitors at their own game; will 
diversification break-up strategic assets that need to be held together; will we be simply 
another player, or a winner in the new market; and what can we learn by diversifying? 
Entrepreneurship: Why are so many new businesses started-up in the light of the well-known 
and punitive venturing failure rates?  An estimated 25 per cent of business start-ups fail 
within the first year.  By year four, half have met their demise.  The answer to this 
phenomenon often lies in the founder’s hubris.  Founders are usually well-aware of the 
chances of failure, but hubris may lead them to believe that they are the ones who can beat 
the odds.  In one study, 81 per cent of founders rated their chances of success at more than 70 
per cent, and about a third rated the likelihood of their succeeding at 100 per cent!  Founders’ 
hubris emanates from inflated positive self-evaluations of their knowledge, skills and 
abilities, all of which may lead to over-confident venturing decisions.  To make matters 
worse, over-confidence is amplified rather than buffered when tasks are difficult, complex 
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and uncertain.  It is often the case that founders’ beliefs in their own capabilities are such that 
they may actually seek-out the challenge of a high-risk environment. Sadly, hubristic 
entrepreneurs may be drawn toward contexts where their hubristic tendencies are particularly 
likely to prove detrimental to their success, but are repelled by more familiar venture contexts 
where their hubris is likely to be least harmful. 
Containing Hubris 
We propose four ‘tools’ for containing the emergence of the hubris in organizations: (1) High 
reliability organizing; (2) Cooperative decision-making processes; (3) Listening for faint 
signals; (4) Diagnosing, grounding and de-isolating the CEO (Figure 1). 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
High reliability organizing 
The High Reliability Organization (HRO) model is an approach to managing high-
risk operations, such as on the flight decks of commercial aircraft, aircraft carriers and in 
nuclear power plants, that seeks to minimize the severity and frequency of disastrous 
outcomes.  The HRO approach was pioneered by researchers who were interested in 
understanding how organizations can operate error-free and avoid catastrophic accidents 
while operating in high-risk environments for very long periods of time.  HROs place 
reliability on an equal footing with performance. They do not try to hide failures.  Instead 
they use them constructively as indicators of the health of the overall system.  They are 
attuned to expecting unexpected, potentially catastrophic events.  They defer to relevant 
expertise and empower frontline experts with decision making authority. 
The development of the HRO concept followed a number of catastrophic incidents 
including those involving leadership errors on the part of the captains of civilian aircraft.  
Several tragic and fatal accidents were attributed to flawed decisions made by the captain 
despite other crew members having been aware of the potential consequences. Yet they were 
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not prepared within a command-and-control culture to question or challenge the captain’s 
authority and instructions.  To rectify this, the international airline industry has introduced 
necessary checks and balances, including the right and duty of less senior crew members to 
query and/or challenge decisions on the part of senior colleagues when they believe them to 
be unsafe. Hubristic individuals can be resistant to learning from mistakes which can militate 
against the HRO principles proposed jointly by organizational researcher Karlene H Roberts 
and civil engineering safety expert Robert Bea are documented in Table 2. 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
Cooperative decision making 
The tone from the top of an organization affects its culture. An attitude from senior 
executives that is over-confident and contemptuous can cause hubris to spread throughout the 
organization.  Cooperative decision making both within and beyond the board reduces the 
risks from CEO hubris and may also prevent a hubristic culture from developing within the 
organization. 
Countering collective hubris at board-level may entail, for example, implementing 
governance rules for the minimization of unacceptable decisions, dialoguing amongst board 
members until an acceptable decision is reached, and avoiding carrying through decisions by 
simple majority voting.  The latter is susceptible to lobbying and collusion as well as to 
intimidation by a charismatic CEO. 
An example of democratic decision-making process is the successful UK high street 
retailer, the John Lewis Partnership (JLP).  John Lewis was named the UK’s ‘most-loved’ 
shop in a 2016 national survey.  It has, moreover, been lauded as a model of ‘responsible 
capitalism’.  The business is founded on a cooperative structure in which members have a 
role in enterprise governance and can hold senior executives accountable.  A feature of JLP 
that makes consensual decision making possible is the fact that it has a written Constitution 
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that sets out its principles, governance system and rules.  The origins of this approach are 
traceable to the founder John Spedan Lewis (1885-1963).  He signed-away his personal 
ownership rights in the business to allow future generations of employees (‘members’) to 
take forward his ‘experiment in industrial democracy’ that is not driven by the short-term 
demands of outside shareholders.  JLP’s senior leaders are accountable to the members of the 
organization for their decisions. All members of the organization (employees) work actively 
for the improvement of the business (see Table 3). 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
Listening for faint signals 
Symptoms of incipient hubris on the part of an organization and its leadership are frequently 
observed, often discussed and usually widely-known both within and often outside the 
organization.  But they fail to stimulate responses that might mitigate its negative effects 
because, perhaps, the organization is doing well and why ‘rock the boat’ in such 
circumstances?  Moreover, exercising power by senior leaders frequently engenders a sense 
of powerlessness on the part of those who cannot do so.  It is unlikely that organization 
members who believe that their boss is going too far, will challenge the same boss who 
exercises control over their employment and career prospects.  The fate of whistle blowers 
attests to the risks involved in ‘speaking truth to power’. 
Traditional approaches to gathering employees’ perceptions and opinions, such as 
staff surveys, have at least two limitations: (1) the information they glean is determined ‘top-
down’ (in-built into the design of survey tools) rather than generated ‘bottom-up’; (2) they 
are owned and/or designed by support functions (such as human resources who may not be 
affected directly) or external consultants (who can hold up a mirror to the organization but 
are unlikely to be in a position to effect deep-seated, longer-lasting change). 
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On the other hand, watercooler conversations and other instances of informal 
organizational communication provide valuable insights to the development of significant 
organizational risks even though the signals they offer may initially be weak.  A more 
nuanced approach for spotting faint, ‘bottom-up’ signals from diverse sources within the 
organization provides early warning signs of the emergence of hubristic leadership.  Faint in 
this context need not be confused with weak: a faint signal can be a strong indicator.  As in 
the analogue of preventative medicine; picking up the faintest of early warning signs might 
make it easier to fix the problem rather than leaving it until disorder becomes incurable.  The 
requirement is to take the trouble to look out for such signals. 
Organizations are social systems that are communicatively constituted.  They offer a 
wealth of untapped verbal and non-verbal information.  Using information systems and/or 
social media to capture the ‘micro-narratives’ of day-to-day organizational life is an approach 
that has been used successfully to understand and manage staff engagement and 
organizational change processes.  These might also be applied in developing novel ways to 
provide early warning signs of the emergence of hubristic leadership.  Changes in language 
use may be associated with the emergence of hubris (see Table 1), and treating CEOs’ lexical 
choices as a faint signaling mechanism may be useful, enabling emerging hubris to be 
identified at-a-distance.  Detecting the linguistic markers of hubris is also amenable to 
machine learning through the automated analysis of evidence in speech patterns that can lurk 
in large volumes of linguistic data (Table 4). 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
Diagnosing, grounding and de-isolating the CEO 
A fourth suggestion relates directly to the CEO who, as the most powerful person in the 
organization, is also likely to be one of the loneliest and most isolated.  Remoteness from and 
lack of calibration with the real-world fuels hubris.  Problems arise when CEOs: (1) take the 
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leadership strengths that led them to being appointed in the first place to extremes; (2) 
compare their personal day-to-day performance with those in their immediate orbit who may 
not be so capable or achieved so much.  It is important to develop processes or mechanisms 
that monitor CEO behaviors, offer them a reality check against genuine peers and help bring 
them back down to earth when necessary. 
Mitigating hubris is as much a function of understanding the unfolding process of 
leadership and how the CEO’s behaviour is changing over time in response to volatile and 
uncertain circumstances (the ‘how’ of leadership) as it is about CEO attributes and 
behaviours (the ‘what’ of leadership, such as establishing strategy, building the leadership 
team, delivering against financial objectives, etc.).  Members of company boards tend to 
concentrate too much on snapshots of ‘the what’, overlooking the ‘hows’ and the ‘whys’ of 
leadership, including how the leadership process itself is changing and what the implications 
of such change might mean in the longer run, see Table 5. 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
For example, to address this issue the CEO of UK insurance group Equitable Life, 
Chris Wiscarson, has put in place systems and processes that keep track of his behaviour.  
Equitable Life recognized that posing the right sorts of diagnostic questions to monitor 
changes in leadership processes is important because the CEO’s role can be an isolated and 
lonely one.  Equitable Life’s CEO suggests that building resistance to hubris should be 
regarded as a joint responsibility of the Board and the CEO, while recognizing that there are 
things that CEOs can and should do to protect themselves from the risks associated with 
hubris. These could include finding a mentor or toe-holder and actively seeking feedback 
from trusted professional colleagues in neutral settings (e.g. alumni groups, professional 
bodies etc.). 
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Conclusion 
Hubristic leadership is a relational and situational phenomenon, a process to which all leaders 
are potentially at risk.  The hazard of hubris is more likely to be mitigated by a palette of 
solutions rather than a ‘silver bullet’. The risks associated with hubris also require fixing 
systemic issues of regulation, legislation, responsibility, accountability and governance.  A 
preoccupation with short-term shareholder gains has strong links to the emergence of hubris. 
Hence there needs to be increased accountability and responsibility on the part of 
stakeholders, including considerations of business ethics and organizational values.   In the 
light of on-going events on the political, as well as the organizational, stage the subject of 
hubris could not be more topical or timely.  The hubris of leaders raises important and 
thought-provoking questions, problems and challenges that warrant increased and urgent 
attention.  It is only by understanding the characteristics, causes and consequences of hubris 
that the hazards that it poses can be combatted and contained. 
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Table 1.  Behavioral attributes of hubris 
1. A narcissistic propensity to see their world primarily as an arena in which to 
exercise power and seek glory 
2. A predisposition to take actions which seem likely to cast the individual in a 
good light—i.e. in order to enhance image 
3. A disproportionate concern with image and presentation 
4. A messianic manner of talking about current activities and a tendency to 
exaltation 
5. An identification with the nation, or organization to the extent that the 
individual regards his/her outlook and interests as identical 
6. A tendency to speak in the third person or use the royal ‘we’ 
7. Excessive confidence in the individual's own judgment and contempt for the 
advice or criticism of others 
8. Exaggerated self-belief, bordering on a sense of omnipotence, in what they 
personally can achieve 
9. A belief that rather than being accountable to the mundane court of colleagues 
or public opinion, the court to which they answer is history or God 
10. An unshakable belief that in that court they will be vindicated 
11. Loss of contact with reality; often associated with progressive isolation 
12. Restlessness, recklessness and impulsiveness 
13. A tendency to allow their ‘broad vision’, about the moral rectitude of a 
proposed course, to obviate the need to consider practicality, cost or outcomes 
14. Hubristic incompetence, where things go wrong because too much self-
confidence has led the leader not to worry about the nuts and bolts of policy 
Source: Owen, D., & Davidson, J. (2009). Hubris syndrome: An acquired personality 
disorder? A study of US Presidents and UK Prime Ministers over the last 100 years. Brain, 
132(5), 1396-1406. 
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Table 2.  HRO principles for mitigating hubris 
HRO Principle Description Mitigates hubris by 
Knowledge All members of the organization 
actively seeking to know what they 
don’t know and communicate openly 
with each other, especially in situations 
that seem odd, unusual, or problematic; 
they are expected to seek knowledge 
and get recognized for it.  Deference to 
front-line expertise is respected. 
Acknowledging the 
possibility of hard-to-predict 
events and being prepared for 
negative unintended 
consequences of over-
confident /over-ambitious 
strategic choices. 
Communication Organization consistently and 
coherently communicates ‘big picture’ 
of what it exists for and what it is 
seeking to achieve; everyone in the 
business knows where and how they fit 
into the bigger picture 
Avoiding silo-thinking; 
embracing systemic thinking; 
is aware of connectivity; 
anticipating knock-on effects 
of over-confident /over-
ambitious strategic choices. 
Reward and 
incentive 
Organizations’ reward and incentive 
systems should do not privilege 
anticipated short-run financial gains 
over long-run impacts.  Such systems 
should be designed to encourage 
recognising the costs of failures, the 
lesson to be learned, and the benefits of 
reliability and sustainability. 
Taking the long-term view, 
and recognizing and 
rewarding individuals who 
challenge over-confident 
/over-ambitious or reckless 
strategic choices. 
Sources: Roberts, K. H. & Bea, R. (2001). Must accidents happen? Lessons from high-
reliability organizations. The Academy of Management Executive, 15(3), 70-78; 
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Table 3.  Mitigating hubris at the John Lewis Partnership (JLP) through the roles of 
Chairman and the Partnership Council 
Role Requirements of John Lewis Partnership’s Constitution 
Chairman Actively seeks to share power with subordinates; delegates as much 
responsibility/encourages as much initiative as possible 
Retains personal responsibility for ensuring that decisions do not put 
at risk the long-term security of JLP and are consistent with JLP’s 
democratic principles 
Accept, as fully as possible, recommendations of the Partnership 
Council (PC) 
Must consult the JLP Board before rejecting PC recommendations 
Maintains open communication with Partners at all levels 
Partners have duty to inform Chairman of anything s/he reasonably 
should know 
Partnership 
Council 
Represents Partners as a whole and reflects their opinion 
Shares responsibility for JLP’s health with JLP Board and Chairman 
Holds the Chairman to account 
Discusses, influences and makes recommendations on the 
development of policy 
Shares in making decisions about the governance of the Partnership. 
May ask the JLP Board or Chairman anything it wishes; they must 
answer unless doing so would damage JLP’s interests 
Shares in decision-making through recommendations to Chairman on 
any subject 
At end of each trading half-year Chairman must attend meeting of 
Council to account for progress and leadership 
Source: https://www.johnlewispartnership.co.uk/content/dam/cws/pdfs/about-us/our-
constitution/john-lewis-partnership-constitution.pdf  Accessed 26 03 2018 
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Table 4.  CEO Language and hubris 
Linguistic markers of hubris for Lord John Browne when CEO of BP 
Researchers have used computational linguistics to explore links between hubris and a CEO 
language.  In study of Lord John Browne of BP, who was identified previously (by Lord 
David Owen, politician and neurologist and originator of the hubris syndrome model, see 
Table 1) as having shown indications of hubris, researchers offered the following example 
to illustrate the hubristic tone in Browne’s assessment of himself and his moral rectitude: 
“This then is my story…about the insights I gained as I transformed a company, challenged 
a sector, and prompted business and political leaders to change.  My adventures included 
going toe-to-toe with tyrants, despots and elected leaders, while bringing them around to my 
way of thinking…” (Browne, 2010: 5)”.  Based on analysis of Browne’s speeches when he 
was CEO of BP Craig and Amernic identified what they claim to be a preliminary diagnostic 
pattern for identifying CEO hubristic language: (1) scores above the normal range upper 
limit for ‘tenacity’, ‘aggression’, ‘accomplishment’, and ‘centrality’; (2) scores below the 
normal range lower limit for ‘communication’ and ‘human interest’.  Owen noted that 
“collective hubris may well prove to be a contributing factor in the risk-taking behind the 
explosion on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig” (p. 146). 
Sources: Browne, J. (2010). Beyond Business.  London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson; Craig, R., 
and Amernic, J. (2014). Exploring Signs of Hubris in CEO Language. Communication and 
Language Analysis in the Corporate World, 69-88; Owen, L. D. (2011). Psychiatry and 
politicians-afterword: Commentary on ‘Psychiatry and politicians.’ The Psychiatrist, 35(4), 
145-148. 
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Table 5.  Diagnosing, grounding and de-isolating the CEO 
What How 
Diagnosing What has changed in the past year; What and where has been the impact 
of such change; Are there examples of important situations in which the 
CEO can be said to have really listened; Has the CEO’s style, especially 
of listening, changed and, if so, in what ways has it changed; What sources 
of stress upon the CEO have there been? 
Grounding Independent, well-informed and trusted confidante, able to hold a 
behavioural mirror and hold the toe of the CEO.  Such individuals (e.g. 
alter ego, confidant, chief of staff or even organizational ‘fool’) with 
whom the CEO can let her or his guard down is a rare, high-value, and 
difficult-to-imitate asset.  Toe-holders capable of grounding a CEO need 
to be chosen judiciously and wisely.  They must be loyal, trustworthy and 
capable but also immune to sycophancy and prepared to resist, contest and 
protest, and ‘speak truth to power. 
De-isolating Providing opportunities for CEOs to compare themselves to other CEOs 
rather than employees in general could have a healthy buffering effect on 
a CEOs’ self-evaluation (for example, formal and informal CEO 
networks, professional bodies, conferences, coaching,, etc.).  Taking 
opportunities to meet regularly and informally with a trusted peer group 
within which the CEO can step out of role and discuss concerns, hopes 
and fears without compromising him or herself. 
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Figure 1.  Tools and techniques for containing the hubris hazard 
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